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Abstract
Malicious software has become a major threat to modern society. It affects to all sectors in 
the industry all over the world[1] . The impact can  vary being from an economic point of 
view to privacy invasion or to damage the targeted system. Being able to understand what 
a malware does can be used for detection and future prevention. For it, is crucial to train 
our  future  professionals.  Analyzing  malware  requires  deep  knowledge  of  Operating 
Systems internal design and tools manipulation. All this knowledge was acquired and 
demonstrated in practice along the project.
This project develops three malware samples and provides their correspondent technical 
reverse engineer analysis. This material has been created with the goal of being used as 
teaching resource at  the laboratories  of  the Master  in  Cybersecurity  at  the University 
Carlos  III  of  Madrid.  The subject  which this  material  is  done for  is  named Malware 
analysis  and  engineering.   Malware  analysis  is  a  really  specific  field  with  a  limited 
resource  access  of  information  for  learning.  This  projects  tries  to  make  that  barrier 
narrower by proving a laboratory exercise for master students. 
To keep the standards of the education quality policy of the university, this laboratory 
exercise is developed for the latest Microsoft Windows platform. The books, articles and 
tutorials  followed  during  project  development  are  mentioned  in  the  document  and 
stablished as reliable sources. The followed methodology with all previously explained , 
ensures to provide nowadays technology and a high level technical skill for a high quality 
education.
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1. Introduction
This section introduces this Bachelor Thesis and presents an overall description  of 
the document.  The context,  detailing briefly the current situation of cybersecurity  and 
specially of reverse malware engineer. The motivation, covering why this project is needed. 
The goal,  that  explains what is  being tried to achieve with this  project.  And how the 
content of the document is structured.
1.1 Context
This project is a teaching project for malware engineer students in the Master of 
Cybersecurity of the university Carlos III of Madrid, concretely in the Malware Analysis 
and Engineering course offered in the second semester .1
Malware  is  any  software  designed  to  disrupt  computer  normal  operation  and 
perform any hurtful or undesired task. It is shorten of malicious software. This definition 
does not include software that causes unintentional harm due to some deficiency. There 
are several types of malware according the task they perform. Infectious malware goal is 
to  propagate,  as  viruses  and  worms.  Others  as  trojans  misrepresents  itself  to  appear 
useful. Rootkit  goal is to stay concealed avoiding detection. And there are some other 
types such as ransomware  that operates for obtaining a direct financial retribution via 
sabotage.  Nowadays  this  malicious  softwares  have  become  really  sophisticated  and 
complex to understand[2]. For doing so, is needed to understand little by little how it has 
evolved and what is composed of. The discipline that studies malware is called malware 
analysis.
Malware analysis  is  a discipline that requires knowledge of different fields but 
mainly two:  reverse-engineering,  and tools  usage.  The techniques that  can be utilized 
while analyzing malware are next listed.
1.- Static analysis: this is the process of analyzing malware binaries without 
executing  them.  It  covers  from  looking  at  metadata  from  a  file  to  disassembly  or 
decompilation of the  malware code.
2.- Dynamic analysis: is the process of analyzing a piece of malware when 
you are  executing it  in  a  live  environment.  In  this  case,  you are  often looking at  the 
behavior of the malware and track the side effects on the system.
3.- Automated analysis: this is to automatize the analysis process.
4.- Manual analysis: just needed if the malware is built with anti-debugging 
routines or anti-analysis mechanisms.
 http://www3.uc3m.es/reina/Fichas/Idioma_2/288.12400.html1
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The  training on cyberdefense skills has become an imperative necessity. This project is built 
for  educational  purposes.  It  contains  three  malware  samples  and  the  correspondence 
reverse engineer analysis.
1.2 Motivation
Nowadays the resources of information for learning cybersecurity are spread by 
the internet and is not always taught as technical and informed as it should be.  A recent 
study from the Ponemon Institute  reveals the average annualized costs caused by cyber 
crimes worldwide on August 2015, Figure 1. In the measured period, cyber crime caused 
an average  annualized loss  of  13.5  million  U.S.  dollars  in  the  global  financial  service 
sector,  12.8  in  the  utilities  and  energy  sector,  6.01  in  the  public  sector  and  3.34  in 
hospitality. Malware is always involved on cybercrime activities. So it is clear this is a 
threat affecting to all modern society.
Figure 1: costs caused by cyber crimes on August 2015
Also it is important to consider that another motivation of the project is to satisfy a need 
that the university may have. This supplies an opportunity to do a project that will be 
used with  clear  and clean  purposes.  This  is  really  important  if  we  are  talking  about 
malware development. Malware development is normally involved with criminal actives 
but this times follows the goal of being used as a study sample. Malware development 
and analysis include fields from different disciplines of computer science. It is a hard but 
profitable way of learning.  Because of that it becomes a challenge.
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1.3 Goal of the project
The goal of the project is to produce a profitable material for the students. For that 
is needed to cover the main concept of common malware techniques.  This means: doing 
practices with nowadays software and with all the possible details for their apprenticeship 
to  be  complete.   In  order  to  do  so  a  lot  of  effort  was  applied  to  bring  to  the  new 
technologies  malware  samples  with  old  and  modern  malware  techniques  that  are 
explained along the project. 
With it, it comes the goal of learning the techniques for designing, developing and 
testing In order to analyze it is important to place yourself first as the designer. Moreover 
is how to analyze it. It include reverse engineering skills. Also, knowing the architecture of 
networks and systems. It is a core part of cybersecurity education. In order to deal with 
possible threats knowing malware analysis is one of the main techniques for nowadays 
cybersecurity professionals. 
1.4 Structure of the document
This document is divided into different sections. Each of them covers part of the 
information related to the work development of this project. This chapters are:
1.-Introduction: this chapters gives a global vision of the project providing the aim 
and goal of it.
2.-Background: in this section is summarized the knowledge acquired for doing the 
project, tools used and the state of art
3.- Virus engineering: this section explains how the virus was developed from 
analysis to implementation and testing.
4.- Trojan engineering: this chapter covers the trojan analysis, design, 
implementation and testing.
5.- Ransomware engineering: here is explained how the ransomware was done. 
Covering analysis, design and implementation phase. Includes testing.
6.- Solution and evaluation of labs: in here the the practices are solved as how a 
student should solve it providing also the questions and evaluation systems of them.
7.- Project planning budget and socioeconomic context: this chapter describes and 
justifies how the project is planned . It is also included any economic impact on it.
8.- Regulatory framework: Related law with restrictions on the project.
9.- Conclusions and improvements: summary  and possible improvements.
10.- Bibliography: this gives the link to all the information referred along the 
document.
This defines the core structure of the document. However each of this sections may have 
subsections also focusing on important aspects of the subject.
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2. Background
Here is described the main concepts of the background knowledge for the 
development of this project. This covers: the PE header, the concept shellcode and 
connect back method and some tools used along the project. The technical knowledge of 
this section was acquired in order to develop the project.
2.1 PE files
The  first  important  thing  to  take  into  account  when  doing  the  analysis  phase  is  the 
Operating System we want to develop the malware for. In this first case the target will be 
Nt based OS. This means, Microsoft Windows Platforms. From now own we will refer to it 
as  Windows.  This  OS,  has  few file  formats  for  executable  programs.  In  this  malware 
sample we focus on the PE (Portable Executable) format. The information source referenced 
on bibliography[3].This determines lots of features of how the development process will be 
carried out and also discards any possible damage on other kind of OS or file formats. 
Another important step for the analysis phase is the kind of PE file we will choose. PE files 
are used for EXE, DLL, SYS and some other files types
Figure 2: Basic PE format 
For understanding the design process first we need to look deeply in the PE structure. The 
format contains at the beginning of the file different types of headers. These headers are 
nested structures defined by Microsoft and can be found in the Microsoft SDK (Software 
Development Kit).  They provide the OS with the necessary information for the correct 
execution of the program.
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There are five main structures that we need to understand of the PE headers. For that, we 
break down the PE file into it’s various sections and examine them.
1.  DOS  header.  The  name  of  the  predefined  structure  for  this  section  is 
_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER.  This  structure  starts  always  with  the  letters  MZ.  These  two 
letters stand for Mark Zbikowski. Mark developed the first linker for DOS primitive OS. 
That two letters became the “magic number” for windows executables. Also in this header 
for Win32 executables you can find the string: This program cannot be run in DOS mode. 
When these executables are run in a 16-bit DOS environment, they display the previous 
error message. 
The DOS header structure is showed on Figure 3:
Figure 3: _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER structure
From Figure 2 is important to mention what is the usage of the next fields:
1.- e_magic: Placed at the top of the DOS header, it exposes which kind of 
file we are dealing with. We need to find the value 5A4D (MZ) which corresponds to a 
executable Win32 PE file.
2.-  e_res[4]: Normally it does not contain information. This place is used in 
this laboratory for marking the infected files.
3.-  e_lfanew:  Placed at  the  the bottom of  the  DOS header,  it  contains  a 
pointer to the IMAGE_NT_HEADER structure.   
2. Nt header.The next structure contains three sections of Figure 1 and also another two 
structures  that  corresponds  to  those  two  extra  sections.  This  structure  is  pointed  by 
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e_lfanew.  The name of the structure in the Win32 SDK is _IMAGE_NT_HEADER.  The 
section corresponding to the first field of this structure is the PE Signature. This is just for 
indicating the ID signature with value “PE/0/0”.  This  provides two different  pieces of 
information. First one, it is a legitimate PE file. Second, the byte order of the file. The next 
section is directly the following chunk of data to the signature and as previously said, it is 
contained in the same data structure.
Figure 4: _IMAGE_NT_HEADER structure
From this structure is important to remark the next fields:
1.- FileHeader: It is a contained structure (_IMAGE_FILE_HEADER) inside 
_IMAGE_NT_HEADER. It corresponds to the File header section.
2.-OptionalHeader:  It  is  a  another  contained  structure 
(_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER). It corresponds to the Optional header.
3. File header. The COFF header (Common Object File Format) is present in object files and 
in linked executable files. Nevertheless when the object file is linked and it turns into an 
executable, then it is normally referred as File header. The structure name for this section, 
as it is visible in Figure 3 is called _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER. 
Figure 5: _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER structure
This data structure contains information such as the architecture the program was built to 
run into (x86 or x86-64),  the number of  sections the program contains,  the timestamp 
indicating when the program was compiled, the size of the next data structure that the OS 
needs to find, some features related to the file being an executable or dynamic library and 
some other which does not concern us by now.
From the File header there is one important field which we need to take into account:
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1.-  NumberOfSections:  This  variable indicates how many sections the program 
contains. It includes the code the data sections and any other one that is needed for the 
program.
4.- Optional header. The set of data following the previous explained one belongs to the 
Optional header. This data structure contains relevant information for the mapping of the 
program  into  dynamic  memory.  Despite  its  name,  is  not  an  optional  structure  but 
essential. The composition can be observed with detail on Figure 6:
Figure 6: _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER structure
The most remarkable variables of this structure are:
1.- SizeOfCode: Size of executable code.
2.- AddressOfEntryPoint:  This field is the most interesting for the PE  file 
format.  This  field indicates  the  location of  the  entry  point  for  the  application.  It  is 
relative to the image base address. For executable files, this is the starting address. In 
DLL files is optional.
3.- BaseOfCode: Relative offset of code (".text" section) in loaded image.
4.- BaseOfData: Relative offset of uninitialized data (".bss" section) in loaded 
image.
5.-  SizeOfImage:  Indicates the amount of address space to reserve in the 
address space for the loaded executable image. This number is influenced greatly by 
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SectionAlignment. The linker determines the exact SizeOfImage by figuring each section 
individually. It first determines how many bytes the section requires, then it rounds up 
to  the  nearest  page  boundary,  and  finally  it  rounds  page  count  to  the  nearest 
SectionAlignment boundary. The total size is then the sum of each section's individual 
requirement.
6.- SizeOfHeaders: This field indicates how much space in the file is used 
for representing all the file headers, including the DOS header, File header, Optional 
header, and Section headers. The section bodies begin at this location in the file.
7.- CheckSum: A checksum value is used to validate the executable file at 
load time. The value is set and verified by the linker. This can be used to verify if the 
actual file is the original one and did not suffer any modification.
8.- DataDirectory: This field is an array of sixteen positions with the RVAs 
for setting up the correct execution environment. Inside of it it contains many different 
structures for each module.
6.  Section  header.  All  the  following  data  contained  in  the  executable  belongs  to  the 
Section headers  with the Mappable sections  following it.  All the Section headers  are 
contained  inside  a  data  structure  that  is  named  _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER.  This 
structure is always 40 bytes length. The data structure is defined as showed in Figure 7:
Figure 7: _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER structure 
The remarkable fields of this structure are:
1.- VirtualSize: This is the total size in bytes, of the section when loaded into 
memory. If this value is greater than SizeOfRawData the section is fulfilled with zeroes. 
This field should be set to 0 for object files.
2.- VirtualAddress: The address of the first byte of the section when loaded 
into memory, relative to the image base.
3.- SizeOfRawData:  The size of the data on disk in bytes. This value is a 
multiple of FileAlignment field on the_IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER structure. If the 
value is less than VirtualSize, the rest of the section would be fulfilled with zeroes.
4.- Characteristics: This indicates with predefined flags the properties of the 
section. Some useful flags we need to remark are explained in the table below.
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TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS FLAGS TABLE OF THE _IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER
The sections can be of different types according to the type of data the contain and their 
purpose. It is important not only to know the flags that indicates the OS the kind of data 
dealing with but also the main types that we can normally face in a PE file.
The most common sections are:
1.- .text/.code/CODE/TEXT: Contains executable code
2.- .testbss/TEXTBSS: Present if Incremental Linking is enabled
3.- .data/.idata/DATA/IDATA: Contains initialized data
4.- .bss/BSS: Contains uninitialized data
2.2 Shellcode
This is a summary of some sections of  Understanding windows Shellcode[4]  paper, 
studied in depth for the development of the project. In this chapter is covered the main 
aspect of what shellcode is. It also focus on the explanation of Connectback method.
 The original word shellcode, comes from the code that was designed for recover from a 
critical error. By lending the custom defined code to run where the program should have 
crashed , it is possible to lunch a protective shell. However nowadays, the good usage of 
it is obviously subjective. Nevertheless in this project personal opinion must be suspend 
and instead, open the mind to a more objective side of the matter.
When attempting to write custom shellcode for Windows it is compulsory to understand 
that, unlike Unix variants, the mechanisms for performing certain tasks are not as straight 
forward as simply doing a system call. Though Windows does have system calls, they are 
generally not reliable enough for use with writing shellcode.
Windows,  as  Linux,  stores  the  system call  number  in  the  eax  register.  The  system call 
number in both operating systems is simply an index into an array that stores a function 
Flag Meaning
IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE This section contains executable code
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE This section can be discarded if needed
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE This section can be executed as code
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ This section can be read
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE This section can be written.
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pointer to go to once the system call interrupt is received. The problem is that system call 
numbers are prone to change between versions of Windows. In Linux this numbers are the 
same  on  any  of  the  different  available  versions.  This  difference  is  the  source  of  the 
problem  about  writing  reliable  shellcode  for  Windows.  Because  of  this  reason  it  is 
considered a  “bad practice” to write code for Windows that uses system calls directly vice 
going through the native user-mode abstraction layer supplied by Ntdll.dll.
The other main problem with the use of system calls in Windows is that the feature set 
exported by the system call interface is more restricted than in other operating systems. 
Unlike Linux, Windows does not offer a socket API trough the system call interface. This 
discards the option of interacting  directly with the kernel.
The Connectback shellcode, or reverse shell , is the process from which a TCP connection is 
established to a remote host and a command interpreter’s input and output are redirected 
to and from the allocated  socket handling the TCP connection. This is useful for times 
when the remote network does not have outbound filtering, or, if it does, does not have 
the filtering on the remote machine and port.  If  either of these cases are not true, one 
should not use the Connectback shellcode as it will not pass through outbound firewalls.
The process involved in doing the previously explained technique on Windows is not as 
straight forward as in other operating systems. Instead of using system calls, is needed to 
use the standard socket API provided by winsock. The NT-based versions of Windows are 
the targets of this analysis.
The first thing needed to do is to find the kernel32.dll address. With the address previously 
found the following functions needs to be resolved: 1. LoadLibraryA , 2. CreateProcessA, 3. 
ExitProcess. The next step is to use the resolved LoadLibraryA symbol to load the winsock 
library ws2_32.dll. In many programs, ws2_32.dll is likely already loaded in memory. As 
such, one can make use of LoadLibraryA to find out where address it was loaded at. If it 
has yet to be loaded, LoadLibraryA will simply load it and return the address where it is 
mapped at. Once ws2_32.dll is mapped into process space the same mechanism used to 
resolve symbols in kernel32.dll to resolve symbols in ws2_32.dll. The following functions 
need to be found and stored in memory for later use: 1. WSASocketA, 2. connect.
With all the required symbols loaded, one may now proceed to do the actual work. The 
following steps outline the process:
1. Create a socket
2. Connect to the remote machine
3. Execute the command interpreter
4. Exit the parent process
The above four steps are all that is involved in implementing a version of Connectback on 
Windows NT-based systems. Some features that one could add include the ability to have 
the  parent  process  wait  for  the  child  to  exit  before  terminating  itself  by  using 
WaitForSingleObject.
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2.3 Tools
In here the main tools used in this project are listed with a brief explanation about  their 
utility:
1.- Ida pro: mainly it is used for static reverse engineering of malware. It provides a 
good analysis of malware samples with diverse backgrounds. It also contains a module 
that converts assembly language into easily read pseudocode. It has a graph view of the 
code and it is possible to switch between both hexadecimal code and the graph view. The 
tool also has debugging functionality.
2.-  Dependency Walker:  is a free utility that scans any 32-bit or 64-bit Windows 
module (exe, dll, ocx, sys, etc.) and builds a hierarchical tree diagram of all dependent 
modules.
3.- PE View: provides a quick and easy way to view the structure and content of 32-
bit Portable Executable (PE) and Component Object File Format (COFF) files.
4.- Process Monitor: Process Monitor is an advanced monitoring tool for Windows 
that shows real-time file system, Registry and process/thread activity. Its a core utility in 
malware hunting toolkit.
5.-  Netcat:  is  a computer networking utility for reading and writing to network 
connections using TCP or UDP.
6.- Wireshark: it is a network protocol analyzer. Dumps traffic and filters it offering 
a functional GUI. It is used across many industries and educational institutions.
7.- VMWare: it is a multi virtual machine handler. It allows hardware configuration 
and specifications. It is used for running all the Windows and Linux OS.
8.- Visual Studio:  Platform of Microsoft for code development. It is a remarkable 
IDE.
2.4 State of art
As  expressed  before  malware  analysis  is  a  specific  field  of  cybersecurity  that 
studies  malware  development  and  engineering.  The  reliable  fonts  of  information  for 
learning are  spread around the  internet  or  in  some academical  papers.  Cybersecurity 
topics are normally possible to learn by self-studying. But as any other field can be quicker 
and better learned if it is explained.
One  of  the  nowadays  most  famous  information  sources  about  cybersecurity 
education is SecurityTube  online portal. This web offers many courses even some of them 2
with certification.  Another portent with many content that was used in this project is 
OpenSecurityTraining .  This platforms and some other more not included are the best 3
information resource at everyones free disposal.
 Link: http://www.securitytube.net2
 http://www.opensecuritytraining.info3
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3. Virus engineering 
A virus is a  type of intrusive malware that replicates itself and inserts copies of 
itself  in  legitimate  programs,  where  it  carries  out  unwanted  and  often  damaging 
operations[1]. Taking this into account, the piece that we are going to describe below needs 
at least to infect another program and perform some other action when the contaminated 
program is executed.
For explaining all necessary details on how this software piece is developed we 
need to go into further architectural details of a program inside the Operating System that 
we choose as target for our malware.
3.1 Analysis 
In  this  section  we  will  examine  the  virus  from  an  analysis  phase  perspective. 
Requirements are expressed brief way. This because is not a software oriented project as 
the program does not offer normal functionalities. The requirements are:
1.- User requirements: 
1.1.- The virus needs to infect other files
1.2.- The target files for infection are executable files.
1.3.- The virus must work on latest Windows platform. 
1.4.- The virus needs to be as stealth as possible in the graphical display.
2.- System requirements:
2.1.- The virus needs to keep the original AddressOfEntryPoint of the 
infected executable.
2.2.- The virus needs to access core functionalities of the OS.
2.3.- The virus must not infect more than a predefined number of six times.
2.4.- It requires of administrator privileges for performing the infection.
3.- Functional requirements: 
3.1.- The virus should offer traces for a profitable reverse engineer.
3.2.- The virus must infect in the last section of the PE.
3.3.- An infected executable must also behave normal when executed
4.- Non functional requirements:
4.1.- The virus will execute correctly  if and only if is executed with 
administrator privileges.
4.2.-  The  virus  must  not  damage  any  device  placed  out  of  the  virtual 
machine that it is provided for the laboratory session.
With  all  this  information  now  we  are  able  to  explain  the  infection  process  design 
principles.
MALWARE ENGINEERING FOR DUMMIES - LUIS BUENDIA  23
3.2 Design
In order to perform an efficient malware the design of the infection needs to be 
accurate. We will use all the previous information in order to inject code inside a PE 
executable file and change all necessary fields for it to go on working “normally” after the 
malware code is executed.
The basic algorithm of the virus is:
1.- Find an executable in a predefined directory.
1.1.- If an executable is found go to step 2.
1.2.- If no executable is found finish the program.
2.-  Check if the executable file fulfills the necessary conditions (see Section 7) 
for infecting it.
2.1.- If they conditions are fulfilled of to step 3.
2.2.- If the conditions are not met go back to step one.
3.- Read and store in buffer all the headers of the PE.
4.- Change al necessary information of the headers.
4.1.- Mark the e_res[0] field in the DOS header for knowing that is an 
infected file and not to infect it any more.
4.2.- If in the Section header the Characteristics field of last section is 
marked as discardable change it, so the program runs our new section.
4.3.- Set also in the Characteristics field the flags of read, write and 
execute.
4.4.- Add to the field SizeOfRawData  and VirtualSize the length of 
the injected code (previously calculated).
4.5.- Copy the original AddressOfEntryPoint from the Optional 
header.
4.6.- Modify the value of the entry point to the new one. This is the 
point where the code will be copied. It is calculated by adding the VirtualSize and the 
SizeOfRawData from the Section header and some extra space where our real 
executable code will start.
5.- Write back to the file the modified headers.
6.- Store the original AddressOfEntryPoint inside the virus code in order to 
jump after the code execution.
7.- Copy the virus code in the target executable.
8.- Jump back to where the program should have started.
However, it is important to consider that the first execution does not match with this 
algorithm. The first time the program runs, it does not have an original entry point to go 
back to. This point will be described and solved in detail in the implementation section. 
Furthermore there are some error and exception cases not described in the algorithm. 
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3.3 Implementation and testing
During the development of the virus several target OS where tested. Staring from 
the original version Windows XP where the virus was developed. But one of the goals of 
this thesis is to provide the students with the latest technology available so to have an 
education on what they can confront in the real world. Because of it, the final version of 
the virus is developed for working on Windows 10. Now that we finally now in which 
system we are working I will explain how the development process was carried out. 
For  the  implementation  of  the  virus  a  different  approach  is  used  instead  of  how  is 
normally described. When implementing malware is important to be as stealth as possible 
to avoid being detected with the common techniques. Many antivirus use heuristics based 
on strings found on the hexadecimal dump of the suspicious executables as well as the 
functions they are using. 
For avoiding our functions to be seen in a basic static analysis we will not directly access 
them  using  dynamic  linking.  In  fact,  if  our  code  is  going  to  be  injected  into  other 
executables is also possible that this files do not import the libraries that we require, so we 
have to assume that we are going to be without nearly any predefined resource we would 
likely need in a normal execution of our code. As we could expect, this needs to be done 
by special techniques. The way explained in the paper Understanding Windows Shellcode[4] 
gives an example on how to perform this task. 
For importing all the basic functions in runtime we first need that the program loads in 
memory the Kernel32.dll library. This contains a set of core functions of Windows OS as 
the ones we are going to use. Normally, every program will import this dynamic library to 
memory. So we need to access to the PEB (Process Environment Block) and search for the 
address where the kernel32.dll is.
Figure 8: Executables modules with Immunity Debugger of a HelloWorld.exe sample
Even in a basic executable  sample the Kernel32.dll is imported. It is important to remark 4
that  if  this  library  is  not  brought  to  memory,  our  code  will  work  with  unexpected 
behaviors.  The  only  library  that  is  imported  a  100% of  times  on  Windows OS is  the 
ntdll.dll. 
 The basic executable is referred to a program that displays “hello world” message.4
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The routine FindKernel32 written in the virus, works for Windows OS Vista, 7, 8, 8.1 and 
10 versions. When called, it access the base address of program in memory and iterates 
trough the structures, returning the address where the library should be located. It was 
developed from the one written on the Understanding windows Shellcode[4]  document 
that works for Windows XP.
After obtaining the address of the core library we just need to search inside it’s headers to 
find the export directory that contains the address of functions table. Now we have access 
to all  the functions of this dynamic library.  Every windows system can have different 
kernel32.dll functions offset. This is due to updates, versions of the same version of the OS 
or just directly different versions. So it is not recommended to hardcode the offset of the 
functions. The advisable technique is to hash the functions and search for the match. This 
may not save computational time, but it occupies less space (useful in malware injections) 
and provides the expected output. Nevertheless it was not used in this virus. The reason is 
not for simplifying the implementation but for not providing the students with a virus 
that can work in every Windows platform. 
So  in  this  case  the  offset  of  the  functions  was  searched  inside  the  kernel32.dll  and 
hardcoded  into  the  virus  code.  Beforehand  a  prototype  of  the  functions  needs  to  be 
defined so when importing them having the appropriate container. For this task the  most 
suitable information source is the Microsoft documentation[5].  
TABLE 2: FUNCTIONS FROM KERNEL32.DLL USED IN THE VIRUS
This functions are used all along the virus for different and fundamental tasks. As it can 
be observed they are quite regular. The only thing that can be out of the scope at first 
sight, are the arguments and return values. These primitives belongs to Microsoft.
Now that we now the functions lets begin with the explanation of how they are used. 
Function Offset Arguments Return
CloseHandle 0x7D HANDLE BOOL
CreateFile 0xB9 LPCSTR, DWORD, DWORD, LPSECURITY_ATTRIBTUES, 
DWORD, DWORD, HANDLE
HANDLE
FindFirstFile 0x16D LPCSTR, LPWIN32_FIND_DATA HANDLE
FindNextfile 0x17E HANDLE, LPWIN32_FIND_DATA BOOL
ReadFileA 0x45B HANDLE, LPVOID,DWORD, LPWORD, LPOVERLAPPED BOOL
SetCurrentDirectory 0x4EF LPCSTR BOOL
SetFilePointer 0x509 HANDLE, LONG, PLONG, DWORD DWORD
WriteFileA 0x5F4 HANDLE, LPVOID,DWORD, LPWORD, LPOVERLAPPED BOOL
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Internally the code is divided in three different functions. The code is developed in 
C and assembly. The main function which is only used in the first execution before the code 
is injected. The second one was already described before and it’s name is: FindKernel32. 
Last but no least InjectMe. This function, as it’s own name suggest contains all the code 
that performs the injection. All the mechanism of finding files, headers modification and 
propagation is  done trough this  function.  However,  is  not  the only one copied to the 
others files.  The function FindKernel32 is  also copied.  And for special  reasons that  are 
going to be explained later, before the FindKernel32, 16 bytes contained in a function called 
specialData are copied also when infecting.
The specialData function is composed by eight “emit” instructions which only function is to 
produce an empty place of 64 bytes corresponding to two different integer numbers. The 
first one is a counter that is incremented each time the virus produces a new infection. 
This can be understood as a propagation control mechanism. So the same code does not 
spreads  more  than  the  number  that  we  specify.  In  our  case  five  times.  So  when  the 
grandchild of the grandchild can not produce any new infection. This is controlled at the 
beginning  of  the  InjectMe  function.  The  second  integer  is  to  store  the  original 
AddressOfEntryPoint where the normal code should have started after being infected.
Figure 9: Memory diagram of the assembled virus
The final structure of the assembled virus should look like Figure 9.  For being able to 
obtain this structure it is essential to use special compile options. This requires disabling 
any optimization or security check method.
In  the  design phase,  a  predefined directory  was  referred for  searching the  executable 
victim. This directory is “C:\\Program Files\”. For being as stealth as possible the string 
is not placed in the code as a variable in ASCII. The string is pushed into the stack in 
assembly code. With this technique when a static analysis is performed it will not appear 
as data of the program making harder to detect where the malware is trying to make 
changes. So, first the pointer is placed in the directory and finds the executables inside it 
with  the  function FindNextFile.  For  searching the  executable  the  virus  use  the  regular 
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expression “*.exe”. Again this string is not written directly as part of data. It is pushed into 
the  stack  as  hexadecimal  code  corresponding  to  the  ASCII  values.  Once  we  find  the 
appropriate  executable  suitable  for  infecting,  we  mark  the  header  with  the  the 
hexadecimal number 0xf001 on the  e_res[0] member of the  DOS header  structure so in 
order  to  know  if  that  file  is  already  infected.  After  that,  just  follows  the  algorithm 
described in the design section. Modify all the the necessary headers by dumping them 
into a buffer doing all modifications. Write the new content on the targeted executable. 
Finally copying all the bytes of the virus into the last section.
The final product of all this study is an executable of  12.888 bytes. For the first set of tests 
I used HelloWorld programs. For the second test I used also a nectat executable. All of them 
placed  inside  the  “C:\\Program  Files\”  directory.  The  virus  needs  to  be  run  with 
Administrator privileges for being able to infect files inside this folder. As this is designed 
for a malware analysis practice I did not developed it for achieving it’s goal without it. 
With a vulnerability and the correct exploit it could perform the task without being run as 
Admin.
TABLE 3: EXECUTABLES USED DURING TESTS
The first  test  was run to see the infection to other files,  the infectious capacity of  the 
previous infected files and the limit infection control. As explained before this is up to five 
executables.
TABLE 4: FIRST TEST RESULTS
As expected the last infected executable was not able to reproduce proving the control 
mechanism.
File name MD5 Hash
VirusPE.exe aa5c073f7b1c948a4d5fbbf207f9329a
HelloWorld.exe 9fed129088d17163b6fca39b3d8ee568
nc.exe e6bd9bdfaccf78741d6fd0a7b83dbad0
Size before infection (btyes) Size after infection (bytes) Fertile
HelloWorld_1 9.216 15.719 Yes
HelloWorld_2 9.216 15.719 Yes
HelloWorld_3 9.216 15.719 Yes
HelloWorld_4 9.216 15.719 Yes
HelloWorld_5 9.216 15.719 Yes
HelloWorld_6 9.216 15.719 No
HelloWorld_7 9.216 - -
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The results were positive and the piece succeeded the test perfectly. It is also possible to 
see the hexadecimal code of the infected programs and in the down part observe the code 
of the virus as showed in the next figure.
Figure 10: Hexadecimal view of the original virus and the infected file
As expected, the offset where the code starts is different since in the infected file the new 
code  is  placed  at  the  bottom  of  the  last  section.  The  specialData  field  empty  in  the 
VirusPE.exe has the two corresponding values in the HelloWorld_1 infected file.
Moreover it is possible to see on the header the new AddressOfEntryPoint in comparison to 
the old one. (Figure 10)
Figure 11: Comparison between entry points of infected and not infected programs
For the second test I used an own compiled version of the Netcat program. This test is 
done to measure the correct performance of any program under the virus infection. The 
reason for doing an own compilation of it was disabling the aslr (Address Space Layout 
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Randomization). This special security measure initializes the code in memory at a random 
position making any calculation based on the ImageBase wrong. 
The test was done with a clean HelloWorld program placed on the directory so when 
executing the netcat program it would be infected. 
Figure 12: Netcat infected on usage infecting other programs
The image above shows the netcat working for an incoming connection already infected 
working perfectly infecting also the HelloWorld program.
TABLE 5: SECOND TEST RESULTS
It can be concluded that the virus is finished and working. The only possible issue are the 
programs compiled with the ASLR flag. These programs when infected and executed are 
able to infect other programs but when trying to jump to the original AddressOfEntryPoint 
they crash as the address where they try to jump to, does not correspond to place where 
the code is. 
Size before infection (btyes) Size after infection (btyes) Fertile
netcat 27.648 34.151 Yes
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4. Trojan engineering
A  trojan  horse,  is  a  computer  program  that  seems  to  produce  an  expected 
functionality for the user but behind the scenes is performing malicious activities. The 
name comes from ancient greek1.
That skill of performing an activity behind the scenes, makes the trojan horse a perfect 
personal data stealer. Most of modern trojans base their activities on leak out the user key 
strokes,  stealing  sensible  information,  web  cam  recording,  private  internet  browsing, 
mining cryptocurrencies etc…
This section explains how the trojan was thought, designed and developed and all the 
information regarding to the activities and infectious operations that it performs.
4.1 Analysis
1.- User requirements: 
1.1.- The trojan needs to infect the system and give a connection back shell.
1.2.- The target files for infection are executable files.
1.3.- The trojan must work on Windows platform. 
1.4.- The trojan needs to provide the user with the graphical display that is 
expected.
2.- System requirements:
2.1.- The trojan needs to modify some behavior of the system
2.2.- It needs to be executed stealthy, providing the expected behavior for the 
user.
2.3.- The trojan needs to open backdoor on the system.
2.4.- It requires of administrator privileges for performing harmful activity.
3.- Functional requirements: 
3.1.- The trojan must offer traces for a profitable reverse engineer.
3.2.- The trojan should be executed whenever a link to an html file is opened 
from Internet Explorer program.
3.3.- The trojan opens a back door in the system when executed.
4.- Non functional requirements:
4.1.- The correct execution of the trojan happens if and only if it is executed 
with administrator privileges.
4.2.- The trojan needs to work only on the virtual machine that it is provided 
for the laboratory session.
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4.2 Design
The trojan is designed based on the bullmose.c[X] trojan. This trojan changes the windows 
registry for execution of default html files. In order to execute the winupdate  and insert a 
script when an html file opened displaying: “Warning: This file has been detected by Windows 
Defender  to  be  infected  with  Win32/BullMoose!”.  This  is  a  basic  functionality that  can be 
extended to provide good knowledge about common behaviors and patterns that a trojan 
can have.
The basic algorithm for the trojan is:
1.- Check the number of arguments provided.
1.1.- If there are two arguments go to step 2
1.2.- Any other number go yo step 4
2.- Open a backdoor
2.1.- Create a socket for a client connection
2.2.- Connect it to the socket acting as server
2.3.- If connection is created go on, otherwise go to step 3.
2.4.-  Create  a  shell  in  a  new process  with stdin and stdout  piped to  the 
socket.
2.5.- Close the handlers to the process.
3.-  Open  the  application  of  Internet  Explorer  with  the  argument  received  as 
parameter.
4.-  Find out the current path where the executable is being executed
5.-  Copy  from  disk  its  own  executable  file  in  the  place  of  C:\\Windows\
\System32\\tabcal.exe
6.-  Modify the value of the key for html files in the system.
61.-  Open the windows key registry for the predefined execution of html 
files with Internet Explorer.
6.2.- Change the value for the tabcal.exe file to execute instead passing the 
first argument to the program.
6.3.- Close the windows registry.
7.- Exit the program
For opening a backdoor in the system uses a method known as connectback. This method is 
described in Understanding windows Shellcode[4]  paper and in background section. In the 
paper is described also the shellcode  for doing it.  The method is not entirely used. The 
implementation in the trojan is done in a different way. But the abstract idea and the final 
compiled code is nearly the same. This method creates a socket, and redirects the stdin 
and stdout of a new shell process to it. The socket is previously connected to a system. 
This is indirect connection as the victim connects to the server and not the other way 
round.  It  is  more  reliable  in  some  cases  because  many  modern  firewalls  prevent  the 
computer from external connection but do not block outgoing connections.
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4.3 Implementation and testing
The implementation of the trojan can be described within the functions that compose it. 
For  each  of  them  different  techniques  described  are  used  to  fulfill  the  requirements 
exposed on the previous sections. The project started on Windows XP  platform. At that 
point the code did not provide any stealth mechanism being really easy to detect and 
relying on the Internet Explorer program. The code is developed in C and assembly. The 
functions of the actual version of the trojan are described as a list with all the explanation 
about them.
1.- Main. This functions checks the given arguments to the program. If it is equal to two, it 
calls  the function openBackdoor.  After that  executes the browser by the shell  command 
open  with  the  parameters  of  the  Internet  explorer  for  program  to  execute  and  the 
argument that was given to the program. This should be the name of the .htmlfile to open.
In the case an argument is not received the trojan must execute the infection process. The 
infection is done in steps:
1.-  Find  the  current  path.  This  is  done  by  calling  the  function 
GetModuleFileName and a buffer of 256 bytes of length to store the result.
2.-  Copy  the  own  executable  with  the  string  on  myPath  variable  to  the 
destination path “C:\\Windows\\System32\\tabcal.exe”
2.1.- The string of the target copy place is hardcoded in runtime into 
the address of the variable so for not being recognized in a basic static analysis.
3.-The target path variable is concatenated with the the string “ %1”. With 
this we make sure to pass one argument when the key is triggered. And because of that 
our trojan will be able to open the Internet explorer process with the introduced argument 
on the shell.
4.-  Open  the  windows registry  at  the  class  root  key  with  the  subkey  of 
“htmlfile\\shell\\open\\command”. This is done with the function RegOpenKeyEx.
5.-  Write the new value of the previous modified variable on the subkey 
value. This is done with the function RegSetValueEx.
6.- Close the windows registry key. Done with function RegCloseKey.
All  the  functions  called  from main  are  dynamically  linked.  So  they  are  visible  when 
performing static analysis. This is intended for making the student easier to see the way to 
a correct solution. There are also hidden functions that are no explicitly linked. This is 
explained also in this section in the next function.
  
2.- FindKernel32. This function searches in the PEB of the process to find the kernel32.dll 
library and return the address. With this is possible for the malware to import functions in 
a stealthy way. This method avoids detection on static analysis as explained before in the 
previous sample also. The function is an assembly routine developed form the original 
version implemented for Windows XP exposed in the Understanding windows Shellcode[4] 
paper.
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3.- OpenBackDoor. The first thing this function does is call the function FindKernel32 and 
store the value in a variable. As before it moves the pointer trough the structures of the 
header, this is: 
1.- From the Dos header go to the last value e_lfanew that provides a pointer 
to the Nt header, 
2.- Go inside the Optional header, look for the data directory 
3.- Store the address where all import functions. 
For being able to import the functions needed in runtime, the malware sample needs to be 
equipped  with  the  prototypes  of  the  functions.  As  before,  the  relative  offset  of  this 
functions is hardcoded so the malware just works on system with the same Kernel32.dll.
The information for the function prototype was borrowed from Microsoft documentation[5].
TABLE 6: PROTOTYPED FUNCTIONS FROM KERNEL32.DLL IN TROJAN
Now  we  need  to  bring  the  library  ws2_32.dll  in  order  to  have  access  to  the  socket 
functions. For this we use the imported function LoadLibrary with a string containing the 
name of the library is pushed into the stack at runtime to prevent function import and 
strings  detection  in  static  analysis.  The  GetProcAddress  function  finds  out  where  the 
functions located inside a library by name. It is used for importing the functions from 
ws2_32.dll into prototyped beforehand functions.
TABLE 7: PROTOTYPED FUNCTIONS FROM WS2_32.DLL IN TROJAN
The functions htons and inet_addr are not imported. This means the value of the IP and the 
port  needs to be already in the code in endianness format. By now it just addresses to 
localhost and port 8008 but when the malware is on release version it has a real IP.
Function Offset Arguments Return
CreateProcess 0xD6 LPCSTR, LPTSTR, LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES, 
LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES, BOOL, DWORD, LPVOID, 
LPCSTR, LPSTARTUPINFO, LPPROCESS_INFORMATION
BOOL
CloseHandle 0x7D HANDLE BOOL
GetProcAddress 0x29F HMODULE, LPCSTR FARPROC
LoadLibrary 0x3AC LPCSTR HANDLE
Function Offset Arguments Return
Connect - SOCKET, struct sockaddr*, int int
WSAStartup - WORD, LPWSADATA int
WSASocket - int, int, int, LPWSAPROTOCOL_INFO, GROUP, DWORD SOCKET
MALWARE ENGINEERING FOR DUMMIES - LUIS BUENDIA  34
The next step the trojan does is to attempt a connection with the socket. If the connection 
function fails,  the program goes out from the OpenBackdoor  function.  Otherwise, the 
function creates a shell process linked to the socket. This linking is done by redirecting the 
standard input (that normally is the keyboard) and the standard output (normally the 
screen) to the socket. The socket can be treated as a file. A file can be read and wrote. The 
function CreateProcess with arguments of the program “cmd.exe” and the standards I/O as 
socket. We create a shellcode of the system for the server connection. With this, the remote 
backdoor is launched.  There is no need to wait for the process to finish. Also during the 
process creation the flag for no windows was set. The executed shell will not create any 
window on the system. 
The final built trojan is an executable file of 9.728 bytes. The trojan was tested in two 
different ways, showing full functionality in both of them. Both tests follow the same goal.  
This goals are:
1.- Proof full infection of the system 
1.1.- Copy to the directory where tabcal.exe is located 
1.2.- Change the windows registry as expected
2.- Trigger the key opening an .html file 
2.1.- Open a backdoor and catch the connection
2.2.- Open the expected process for the user.
In the first test the next executables were used: 
TABLE 8: EXECUTABLES USED IN TROJAN TESTS
The original version of tabcal.exe was backed up for security purposes before running the 
tests.The first test was completed with a successful result. The trojan infection was 
achieved on first execution as expected.
Figure 13 & 14: Comparison of trojan substitution file
The first file and original of the system tabcal.exe replaced by our malware executable, as 
showed in Figure 13 & 14. 
File name MD5 Hash
Backdoor Trojan.exe 7cce8d3a3d7e3f094ff9e594b92e9e8f
tabcal.exe c14fc081441a1b042a5f1d17e3eaef60
nc.exe 5dcf26e3fbce71902b0cd7c72c60545b
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Also the windows registry is modified successfully as showed in Figure 15 & 16.
Figure 15 & 16: Comparison of windows registry modification
It is possible to see in Figure 16 how the command contains the %1 that passes the 
parameter of the command to the program. The second part of the first test is to open 
an .html file and wait for the incoming connection with the netcat program.
Figure 17: Netcat program backdoor when html file is opened
If the default program is Internet Explorer or it is used manually for opening any .html file 
the file will be displayed in the same moment without being able to realize that is opening 
a back door in the way.  The netcat performing as server waits for the connection and 
displays the cmd process.
For the second test the trojan was recompiled but pointing to a different address. The local 
IP of my own computer. Outside the virtual machine. 
TABLE 9: EXECUTABLES USED IN TROJAN TESTS
File name MD5 Hash
Backdoor Trojan.exe 037d491533ec844cb4fac6e60e92f89d
nc 2cbc307230ad7cd8050109ea4f2bd078
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This time netcat application runs in on Mac OS version 10.11.6.
Figure 18: Connection of the trojan to another machine
The trojan gave a backdoor access as showed in Figure 18. It is possible to access to all the 
partition with cmd commands and root privileges. It will not work in other machines as 
the offset to the functions is hardcoded. To conclude, the trojan is done, it mets all 
requirements and is ready for reverse engineering.
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5. Ransomware engineering
The ransomware is a new recently developed type of malware. This programs 
infect the system of the victim encrypting or locking certain parts of the system and 
demands a payment (ransom) for unlocking the files[6]. 
This section details the development process from the idea to the final implementation 
and testing.
5.1 Analysis
1.- User requirements:
1.1.- The ransomware needs to activate if and only if: there is connection to 
the specified IP1 and if a specified pdf2 file exist.
1.1.- The ransomware needs to lock the specified files3 on the system.
1.2.- The encryption must be reliable for any kind of file.
1.3.-  The  ransomware  needs  to  generate  a  symmetric  key  form  the  pdf 
metadata.
1.4.- The ransomware needs to display a message with a banner for the user. 
1.5.- The banner needs to provide the instructions to decrypt the files.
2.- System requirements:
2.1.- The ransomware needs to be given with instructions for the pdf file.
2.2.- It needs to be a standalone executable.
2.3.- The computer needs access to the network.
3.- Functional requirements: 
3.1.- It needs to offer the functionalities of a ransomware.
3.1.- The ransomware must offer traces for a network analysis.
3.2.-  The  ransomware  must  provide  the  same  files  before  and  after 
encryption.
3.3.- The ransomware needs to block computer management tools.
4.- Non functional requirements:
4.1.- The communication of the ransomware with the server must provide 
consistency in the information storage.
4.2.- The ransomware needs to be non functional out of the virtual machine 
that it is provided for the laboratory session.
4.3.- The ransomware does not provide guarantee at wrong usage.5
1 Specified IP: IP of the running server 
2 Specified pdf: Pdf file in C:\Users\user\Desktop\sample.pdf directory 
3 Specified files: files inside the user folder
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5.2 Design
The ransomware project is divided into server and client. For explaining the design of 
each of them, first is needed to understand the communication of the whole system.
The components of the system are:
1.- Client: Executed in the victim computer.
1.1.- It encrypts the files. 
1.2.- Sends symmetric key used for encryption.
1.3.-Receives user input, demands the key to the server.
1.4.- Decrypt the files.
2.- Server: Stores and serves the key to clients from a database. 
2.1.- It bases the identification of the clients in their mac addresses.
There is a total of 5 messages described in the design of the system. Depending on the 
client necessities (storing or asking for the key) the clients send on of these two messages.
1.- K:MAC_ADDRESS: This indicates the client just encrypted the victim and 
wants to store the key. 
2.- D:MAC_ADDRESS: This indicates the client wants to retrieve they key to 
decipher the files.
In order to protect the symmetric key used for encryption, asymmetric encryption is used. 
The chosen algorithm is RSA. The length of the key-pair used is of 512 bits. It is intentional 
to choose a weak key. This offer the students the possibility of breaking it. 
The encryption gives  the  system the security  of  confidentiality  when transmitting the 
symmetric key form the client to the server. The key pair is stored in the server. The public 
is send to the client for encrypting the symmetric key before sending it. The private key 
remains in the server. It is used before sending the symmetric encrypted key stored in the 
server database. Finally the communications is defined in the next messages.
For storing the key:
1.- Client sends K:MAC_ADDRESS to the server
2.- Server sends public key of RSA to cipher the symmetric key 
3.- Client sends the encrypted symmetric key.
For retrieving the key:
1.- Client sends D:MAC_ADDRESS to the server
2.- Server deciphers the key and send it back.
As the system needs to provide reliability to handle multiple clients it is important that 
the server is multithreading. For storage it uses a database. The database identifies the 
entries because of the mac address. The mac address provided must be the one of the 
interface connected to the actual network where the computer is communicating trough.
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The encryption of the file system is done with DES encryption algorithm. It uses Electronic 
Code Book (ECB). This is the simplest encryption mode. Each of the plaintext blocks is 
directly encrypted into a cipher block, independently of any other block. This mode 
exposes frequency of symbols in the plaintext. It is done with an 8 length key. As before is 
intended to motivate the students to break the encryption. 
For providing the functionality required the algorithm for the client of the ransomware is:
1.- Fulfill the special condition for working
1.1.- If it is not met, go to step 16.
2.- Generate the symmetric key for encryption from the pdf metadata.
3.- If is not the first execution go to step 12.
4.- List all files in the user folder.
5.-  Take out from that list the system folders.
6.- Encrypt the files in the list.
7.- Start the K:MAC_ADDRESS communication described before.
8.- Wait to receive the RSA public key of the server.
9.- Cipher the symmetric key with it.
10.- Encode the ciphered symmetric key in base 64. With this we avoid any loss due 
to special characters and avoid endianness issues translations.
11.- Send it to the server.
12.- Display a window to the user with a banner and a timer.
13.- If the user press a button the client starts D:MAC_ADDRESS communication.
14.- The client receives the deciphered key in base 64.
15.- Decrypt the files on the system.
16.- Exit the program
The server follows the next algorithm:
1.- Initialize the database table and clean it if need.
2.- Wait for a client to connect.
2.1.- If the first letter of communications is K go to step 3.
2.2.- If the first letter is D, go to step 7.
3.- Send the public key.
4.- Receive the encrypted symmetric key.
5.- Store the key mac pair in the database.
6.- Close communication go to step 2.
7.- Search the mac address in the database.
8.- Decipher the key.
9.- Encode it in base 64 and send it to the client.
10.- Close the connection and go to step 2.
The database in the server contains the ciphered symmetric key. This also provides 
security over the database. 
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5.3 Implementation and testing
The implementation of the ransomware is  done in python  programming language.  For 
covering the implementation the two python scripts  are  exposed within their  internal 
functionality.
The script of the client contains a total of 17 functions including main. This script charges 
the data of the GUI as global variables before starting the main function of the program. It 
checks at the beginning if it has been executed before. Depending on that, it executes the 
encryption mechanism or displays the window. A graphical user interface as showed in 
Figure 19.
Figure 19: Ransomware interface
The GUI is divided in the text area and the objects area. The text area contains the banner 
to the user. The button of “Restore files” decrypt the system and activates the exit button. 
Moreover the timer stops and changes the color to green. The exit  button finishes the 
program.
The server has graphical mode or a log mode depending on the teachers decision. It uses a 
sqlite database generated when running. The database is placed on the same directory of 
the  script.  The  name  of  this  database  is  ransom.sqlite.  It  contains  one  table  named 
key_mac. This table has three fields 
1.- key TEXT: Store the symmetric key encoded in base 64.
2.- mac TEXT: Store the mac address of the client.
3.- count INTEGER: Not in usage. Possible primary key
Executed as python script “python script.py.”.  It  is  recommended to give administrator 
privileges for allowing network connections. If no argument is provided the script will ask 
the user for an input that must be “y” or “n” in order to delete a previous database if exist 
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and create a new one. This process can be skipped but introducing the option directly 
after the command. 
It has two ways of  being activated. The server contains the two RSA-keys. It is a TCP 
multithreading server with connection to a database. 
For configuring the scripts to work, it is needed to place the correct ip on the client script. 
In order to create an executable for the python code the tool used is pyinstaller. This 
program is able to transform a python script to a windows standalone executable. 
The system was tested in two different ways. First to provide reliability on the message 
exchange and the complete range of functionalities that it has. Second to see how the 
system worked under multiple client requests. Both tests are done in virtual machines 
with Windows 10 as OS. There is always placed a pdf with the name “sample.pdf” in the 
directory and the user name must be “user”. This are security measurements make the 
system useless in other machines.
The first test is done with an executable of 6.146.919 bytes named windowTimer.exe. 
Server: 192.168.1.47 My computer
Client: Windows 10 VMWare machine. 192.168.1.43
TABLE 10: FILES USED IN RANSOMWARE TEST 1
The system worked as expected. Te server logs all the communications between server 
and client as showed in Figure 20.
Figure 20: Logs of the server
File name MD5 Hash
windowTimer.exe 7ce2db29d1a058339926379a30e7583b
serv_min.py ab097f5a706207f78f118fc8ee8fa214
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The executable copied itself successfully in the directory: “C:\Users\user\AppData\
\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\t2_ransom.exe”. With this it 
provides also the ability for executing on startup. The files are encrypted and decrypted 
correctly as seen in Figure 21.
Figure 21: Ransomware decrypted file
If the user tries to open any Task Manager or cmd  processes, they are closed immediately. 
The timer executed as expected. The count down works without delay. The encryption 
time depends on how much files the user folder contains. This program is not designed 
for working in real environment. There is just one thread for performing encryption. The 
encryption time for a real application should be reduced.
Figure 22 && 23: Encryption timings
This is code is not focused on performance. Although with a little number of files works 
quickly.
Test number two was done over a server out of a NAT. There were 5 machines involved in 
performing this test. One acting as server and 4 different clients. The goal of this test was 
to proof the key management system and identification for many clients.
TABLE 11: TEST 2 RANSOMWARE HASH
The server used for this test corresponds to a private server. It contained the database and 
the server code.
File name MD5 Hash
t2_ransom.exe 21e02ae1c94bf6a2ee79a5a5de71660c
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Clients run a Windows 10 VMWare machine. . The IP and mac address are enumerated: 
1.-83.57.159.50, 00:0c:29:eb:bd:4e 2.- 81.35.201.15, 00:0c:29:0b:ca:93 3.- 81.43.194.254, 00:0c:
29:f6:b6:f6 4.- 146.158.150.231, 00:0c:29:1e:48:ab
In the first set of images (Figure 24, 25 && 26) we can see the images used for 
testing the encryption along with the random pdf. This is the pdf that is used for the 
symmetric key encryption.
Figures 24, 25 && 26: Images used on different computers for ransomware testing
At this point the systems were unable to create any task manager or cmd process. The 
ransomware is copied in the startup folder. So even if the computer is rebooted the 
ransomware will produce the same effect again. The server meanwhile stores they key of 
each of them in the database,
The Figures 27, 28 & 29 show files after during the infection 
Figures 30, 31 && 32: Decrypted images in test 2
It is possible to see in Figures 30, 31 32 the images placed inside the virtual machine for 
the test with the green window timer. Proving that, the distributed system for managing 
and identifying different clients works. 
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All systems recover normal functionality and the system was tested to provide handling 
multiple clients. The logs of the server provide all the necessary information about the 
connection of them. As showed in figure 33.
Figure 33: Logs of the server test 2 ransomware
To conclude, the ransomware works for an environment as a laboratory session. It 
provides full encryption and leaves a lot of network traces for performing and interesting 
analysis over it. Being compiled from python makes the disassembly more tedious as all 
the python interpreter is embedded into the executable, but it is rather for dynamic 
analysis purposes.
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6. Solution and evaluation of labs
In this section I will provide what can be a possible perfect solution for the practical 
assessments as well as the evaluation system for them.
6.1 Virus
6.1.1 Virus evaluation system
The  punctuation  system  for  the  virus  practical  laboratory  is  according  to  the 
accurate answer for the next  questions.  The questions can be punctuated in fractional 
numbers according to the teachers criteria.
1.- Hash malware sample (0.25 pnts)
2.- Find strings (0.25 pnts)
3.- NT Header info (0.5 pnts)
3.1.- Timestamp for compilation date (0.25/0.5 pnts)
3.2.- Subsystem of the virus (console or gui) (0.25/0.5 pnts)
4.- Section headers SizeOfRawData vs VirtualSize (0.5 pnts)
5.- Imported and Exported Functions (0.5 pnts)
6.- Protecting environment(0.5 pnts).
7.- Find the directory where the malware is searching and realize a target. (1 pnt)
8.- Reverse engineer the malware. (3 pnts)
8.1.- Find out that malware is finding the base address for the kernel32.dll 
(1.5/3 pnts)
8.2.-  Find  out  that  it  is  importing  functions:  CloseHandle,  CreateFile, 
FindFirstFile,  FindNextfile,  ReadFileA,  SetCurrentDirectory,  SetFilePointer, 
WriteFileA. (1.5/3 pnts)
9.-  Mention the mark in  e_res[0]  inside DOS header  and also that  is  used for 
prevention of double infection (1 pnt)
10.- Related to specialData: (1.5 pnts)
10.1.- Find where the original AddressOfEntryPoint is stored (0.5/1.5 pnts)
10.2.-  Find the number for controlling the infection (0.5/1.5 pnts)
10.2.1.- Conclude maximum value for that number. (0.5/1.5 pnts)
11.- Mention the change of the AddressOfEntryPoint (0.5 pnts)
12.- Find in which section the virus replicates when infecting (0.5 pnts)
The total sum of the points is up to 10. Any more information added can supply other 
lacks according to teacher personal opinion.  
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6.1.2 Virus solution
The malware piece  given is  a  PE32 executable  for  MS Windows (console)  Intel 
80386 32-bit architecture. 
TABLE 12: FINGERPRINT AND DATA OF THE SAMPLE
With a first approach from the command line we are able to see the strings found inside. 
This can be helpful for understanding its functionality and the possible inputs of some 
functions  as  well  as  any  output  message.  Moreover  it  can  show  any  information  as 
metadata.  For performing this we just use the command strings.  The most remarkable 
strings found were:
1.- Failed to infect a file
2.- Successfully infected a file
3.- VirtualProtect failed
All of them point to a virus malware type. As infecting, not infecting and the directory 
where the original output program was. It is also possible to see that this program was 
compiled and done trough Visual Studio 2015. The name of the user account “user” does 
not give us any clue about who possibly developed the malware. The other found strings 
are  not  relevant  and  can  be  found in  any  normal  Windows  program.  Paying  special 
attention to string number 3. This string may indicate that the malware is trying to use the 
VirtualProtectEx function. We will solve that when seeing the imported functions.
From the NT header  we can conclude two things.  First  one,  the program is build for 
running in windows  console  without any GUI.  Second,  from the timestamp we can see 
when it was compiled. The date corresponding to the timestamp 576E9A5A  is the 25th of 
June at 15:51:06 in 2016.
For trying to guess the objective of this malware sample we go trough it with the  program 
Dependency walker.  This program shows us the functions imported by dynamic linking. 
The result did not offer any new perspective about the behavior.
Louse.exe
Hash (sha-1) aa5c073f7b1c948a4d5fbbf207f9329a
Hash (md5) 34e1c3386e8339ab1f7f00075685ca0093ff140c
Size (bytes) 12.288
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Figure 34: Dependency Walker view of the jumper.exe sample
The remarkable functions used in common windows malware are:
1.- IsDebuggerPresent:  This function checks if the current process is being 
debugged, often as part of an anti-debugging technique.
2.- QueryPerformanceCounter: Used to retrieve the value of the hardware-
based performance counter. This function is sometimes using to gather timing information 
as part of an anti-debugging technique.
3.- VirtualProtect: Changes the protection on a region of memory. Malware 
may use this function to change a read-only section of memory to an executable.
Functions 1 and 2 are often added by the compiler and are included in many executables, 
so  simply  seeing  them as  imported  function  does  not  provide  any  reliable  source  of 
information. Bu function number 3 confirms our previous suspicious. This program tries 
to transform a region of memory and it has an error message to display in failure. That is 
the string found before. 
One of the most interesting sources of information in the PE header is the Sections 
headers.  With  this  we can  distinguish  easily  if  the  malware  is  obfuscated or  packed. 
Comparing the VirtualSize with the SizeOfRawData, if any of these techniques are applied 
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it will be clear because of the difference of space in memory than the one is occupying on 
disk.
TABLE 13: SIZE OF SAMPLE SECTIONS 
The sizes  are  more  or  less  similar  in  nearly  all  cases.  With the  expiation of  the  .gfids 
section. This section has been recently introduced by Microsoft in the Visual Studio 2015 
compiler. It’s purpose is not absolutely clear yet and has not been also specified in the 
official documentation so we will not take it into account as an evidence of obfuscated 
malware. In any case the sections observed in here reveal that our previous doubts about 
the malware conditions are false. It is not packed or obfuscated.
Our next step is try to perform a dynamic analysis to see the behavior of the sample and 
drop into conclusions seeing reliable traces of what it is doing. For it I will use the Process 
monitor tool. This allows us to filter all the activity related to a process. In our case it was 
simple because the process name was the same as the name of the executable.
Figure 35: Monitor process of the sample louse.exe
The malware is accessing to a directory and modifying one of the executables located in 
there. The problem is that none of the functions it is importing are able to perform this 
tasks. Before going to analyze the sample that this malware touched is mandatory to 
proceed to reverse engineer the malware to see how it is working internally. For that task a 
tool as IDA pro can be really helpful when disassembling.
Section Virtual size Size of raw data
.text 1967 1A00
.rdata 9A6 A00
.data 3F0 200
.gfids 20 200
.rsrc 1E0’ 200
.reloc 170 200
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After  a  depth  analysis  of  the  malware  trough  reverse  engineering  several  interesting 
behaviors of the malware can be explained. The malware first tries to reach the address of 
the Kernel32.dll.  The assembly routine that performs this task is the one on the image 
below.
Figure 36: Assembly routine finding kernel32.dll address
After that it goes trough the headers of the library until the table of export functions. In 
there by hardcoding the offsets it takes the address of the functions for performing all the 
operations for finding, reading, writing and closing a file. The assembly routine where it 
does  that  is  clearly  visible  in  the  images  below.  All  the  names  that  IDA Pro  assigns 
automatically where changed for a better vision of the analyst.
Figure 37 & 38: Routine storing functions addresses
With all the above “imported” functions this sample is able to manipulate any kind of file. 
It is also possible to see the name and address of this functions on the stack trace.  This 
functions  are:  CloseHandle,  CreateFile,  FindFirstFile,  FindNextfile,  ReadFileA, 
SetCurrentDirectory, SetFilePointer, WriteFileA. Moreover two extra strings were found on 
the reversed code.
Figure 39 & 40: Hexadecimal strings inside louse.exe
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This two strings were not found at first in the analysis probably because they were not 
included as data of the normal program. First one indicates the path where the search 
starts and the second one is the regular expression for searching a target executable file.
The malware even checking with a regular expression the executable files, also checks the 
magic number of the executable.
Figure 41: Assembly routine checking the magic number of target
If the magic number is not found, the malware will close the file and check for others in 
the same directory. If it is, it jumps to the next code section for starting the infection
Examining the HelloWorld.exe accessed by the sample I found the first relevant difference 
inside the DOS header. In here, the field e_res[0] contained the number 0xf001. This can be 
seen in the reverse engineering. It is used as sanity check for controlling already infected 
files.
Figure 42 & 43: Assembly routine checking the sanity check  and writing on NT header
The first image shows how it compares the value and the second one how it is written into 
the NT header of the victim program.  After that the program performs many tasks as 
copying himself into the target executable. Also it changes the AddressOfEntryPoint and 
point it to the address in the last section where it copies itself. 
Figure 44: Infected file AddressOfEntryPoint modified
For  executing  the  program  as  it  should  after  infection  it  stores  the  original 
AddressOfEntryPoint  in  the  4  bytes  just  before  the  code  is  copied.  In  memory,  when 
disassembling is also before the code and is included in the mapping of normal code.
Figure 45: Stored data of the original AddressOfEntryPoint
MALWARE ENGINEERING FOR DUMMIES - LUIS BUENDIA  51
This “data”  at the beginning of the code is accessed many times, in fact it increase it’s 
value every new infection. So the same code that is replicated one an another increase this 
value.  The maximum number is  up to five.  This  is  possible  to be seen clearly on the 
disassemble of the infected files.
Figure 46: Routine for checking the current infections produced
At the beginning of the code it checks itself to see how much infections it has produced 
already. The value of the EAX register in Figure 46, is  for showing the memory address 
where this data is stored. It corresponds to the address of Figure 47.
Figure 47: Stored data of the number of infections and entry point in memory
In  the address  displayed in  Figure XX+1,  the  number of  produced infections and the 
original AddressOfEntryPoint  are stored. The entry point is not exactly the original one. 
This is because is summed up with the ImageBase. The data in the header is just for the 
data in the disk, once in memory is needed to add that base to arrive to the point where 
the code really is mapped in memory. The method will not work if ASLR is applied.
Due to the self-reproduction skill  without targeting any outsider system, this malware 
sample can be classified as Virus. The methodologies applied for hiding the functionality 
shows the writer was skilled. However this virus is not harmful and nearly all programs 
nowadays will not work with this kind of infection due to ASLR. Moreover is essential to 
execute the program and the infected children with Administrator permissions for it to 
work. Nevertheless it is good for practicing and improving the reverse engineering skills.
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6.2 Trojan
This section describes the evaluation method and an analysis of the sample that 
matches the requirements.
6.2.1 Trojan evaluation system 
The trojan is evaluated according to the following questions that the student needs to 
fulfill in their document, exactly as before with the virus.
1.- Hash malware sample (0.25 pnts)
2.- Find strings (0.25 pnts)
3.- NT Header info (0.5 pnts)
3.1.- Timestamp for compilation date (0.25/0.5 pnts)
3.2.- Subsystem of the sample (console or gui) (0.25/0.5 pnts)
4.- Section headers SizeOfRawData vs VirtualSize (0.5 pnts)
5.- Imported and Exported Functions (0.75 pnts)
6.- Protecting environment(0.5 pnts).
7.- Compere the hashes of the original file to the copied field to be sure there is no 
change. (0.5 pnts)
8.- Find the registry key being modified and the new value of it and/or the load of 
the ws2_32.dll library.(0.5 pnts)
9.- Reverse engineer of the sample: (4.5 pnts)
9.1.- Arguments required by the program (0.5/4 pnts)
9.2.- Find the hardcoded strings and the infection routine 1.“C:\\Windows\
\System32\\tabcal.exe”  2. ‘html\shell\open\command’ (0.5/4)
9.3.-  Find out  the  function findKernel32  and the functions  loaded with it. 
LoadLibrary, CreateProcess CloseHandle and GetProcAddress (1/4 pnt)
9.4.-  Functions  loaded  from  ws2_32.dll:  WSASturtup,  WSASocketA  and 
connect. (0.5/4 pnt) 
9.5.-  Host  and  Port  trying  to  connect  to.  This  can  be  done  by  different 
methods. (0.75/4 pnt)
9.6.- Flow changes depending on success of connection. (0.5/4 pnts)
9.6.- Process cmd created with socket related to it and InternetExplorer shell 
execution (0.75/4 pnt).
10.-  Intercept the connection of the malware (0.75 pnts)
The total sum of the points is up to 10. Any more information added can supply other 
lacks according to teacher personal opinion.  
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6.2.2 Trojan solution
The first thing we should do  with the malware sample is create a record of it. For that i 
take the hash of the sample and its exact size.
TABLE 14: FINGERPRINT AND DATA OF THE SAMPLE
We will use a first touch with the sample by examining the strings that it contains. For this 
we use the command strings from the terminal. This can tell us about the strings used by 
the code in order to identify possible behaviors. The most remarkable ones are:
1.- CopyFileW
2.- RegCloseKey
3.- RegOpenKeyExW
4.- RegSetValueExW
5.- ShellExecuteW
6.- SHELL32.dll
7.- ”C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe"
It  is  easy  to  realize  strings  from 1  to  4  are  strings  of  functions  corresponding  to  the 
management of the windows registry key. In combination with number 7, the path to the 
executable, can be used for host-based signatures. However in those strings there is no 
windows registry specified. The fifth and sixth correspond to strings with shell execution 
process function and the dynamic library to it. From this information, is early for saying 
those are exact functions or just strings. It will be clear on the imported and exported 
function analysis. 
From the NT header  we can conclude two things.  First  one,  the program is build for 
running in windows  console  without any GUI.  Second,  from the timestamp we can see 
when it was compiled. The date corresponding to the timestamp 5632D53C is 7 September 
of 2016 at 1:16:01 CEST
One of the most interesting sources of information in the PE header is the Sections 
headers.  With  this  we can  distinguish  easily  if  the  malware  is  obfuscated or  packed. 
Comparing the VirtualSize with the SizeOfRawData, if any of these techniques are applied 
it will be clear because of the difference of space in memory than the one is occupying on 
disk.
Trojan.exe
Hash (sha-1) b7434dee9d31fe66b454d899e039fffea4fc4b8b
Hash (md5) 037d491533ec844cb4fac6e60e92f89d
Size (bytes) 9.728
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TABLE 15: SIZE OF SECTIONS SAMPLE
The sizes  are  easily  observed to  be  more  or  less  similar  in  nearly  all  cases.  With  the 
expiation of the .gfids section. This section has been recently introduced by Microsoft in 
the Visual Studio 2015 compiler. It’s purpose is not absolutely clear yet and has not been 
also  specified in  the  official  documentation so  we will  not  take  it  into  account  as  an 
evidence of obfuscated malware. It is not packed or obfuscated.
For trying to analyze this malware sample we go trough it with the dependency walker. 
This program shows us the functions imported by dynamic linking. The result  clearly 
offered a light about the malware behavior. The first picture shows the different libraries 
that the malware is linked to.
Figure 48: Libraries imported by the sample 
The first library is kernel32.dll, it contains most of the core windows api functions and is 
present in almost every program. The interesting fact about this library is watching which 
function it brings. The second one, corresponds to the windows registry key management 
library. Shell32.dll contains the functions for executing a process. And the vcruntime140.dll 
is a runtime memory library function. 
The important functions of kernel32.dll are:
Section Virtual size Size of raw data
.text 0FF3 1000
.rdata A60 200
.data 3D4 200
.gfids 20 200
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Figure 49: Function from kernel32.dll imported in the sample
1.- CopyFile: This function is used to copy one file to other location. This 
function by itself is not harmful but it can be used by malware to copy itself to other 
location.
2.- GetModuleFilename:  Returns the filename of a module that is loaded in 
the current process. Malware can use this function to modify or copy files in the currently 
running process.
3.- GetModuleHandle: Used to obtain a handle to an already loaded module. 
Malware may use the function to locate and modify code in a loaded module or to search 
for a good location to inject code.
4.- IsDebuggerPresent: Checks to see if the current process is being 
debugged, often as part of an anti-debugging technique. This function is often added by 
the compiler and is included in many executables so it provides little information.
Figure 50: Imported function of advapi32.dll
The important functions of advapi32.dll are:
1.- RegOpenKey: Opens a handle to a registry key for reading and editing. 
The registry also contains a whole host of operating system and application setting 
information. So it can be harmful that the malware try to access to it.
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2.- RegSetValue: Assigns value to a registry key. With this the malware is 
able to set behaviors to the system.
3.- RegCloseKey: It closes a handle to a registry key previously opened. 
According to the previous functions the malware performs operations with the three of 
them in order to have a complete functionality over the registry.
Figure 51: Imported functions of Shell32.dll by the sample
From Shell32.dll library it just takes one function:
1.- ShellExecute: This function creates a new process. In the dynamic 
analysis this process should be reviewed also.
The last functions imported by the sample are for handling dynamic memory.
With all this information we can deduce that the malware will try to copy a file, modify 
the normal behavior of the system by modifying the windows registry and also spawn a 
process.  This  is  a  major  recognized threat.  By now there  is  no connection to  external 
machines. But we need still to see the process it will lunch and the malware itself with 
dynamic analysis. 
After the environment configuration the Process monitor tool will allows us to filter all the 
activity related to a process. In our case it was simple because the process name was the 
same as  the name of  the executable.  And from there we can maybe trace if  any new 
process  is  created and its  name.  The search was  quite  profitable  and revealed lots  of 
functionalities of the executable file.
Figure 52: ProcessExplorer view when executing the sample
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In the process analysis we can see how the file read is the executable file and written one is 
tabcal.exe situated in the System32 directory. So the malware copies itself looking to be the 
program previously mentioned that is an actual real file of the windows system. There is a 
registry key modification. A good tool for registry analysis is Regshot. With Regshot and 
the previous backup of the registry is possible to find the modified value register.
It  is  contained  in  the  HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT   in  the  subkey  path  ‘html\shell\open
\command’. The value of the register can be seen in the figure below.
Figure 53: Registry modified value
This  register  will  trigger  a  command every  time  a  .html  file  is  opened with  Internet 
Explorer.exe. Thats why it correspond in the html directory open. It points directly to the 
tabcal.exe file created before from the original malware. The infection is completed when 
the two things are performer. In the screenshot of the register value it is possible to see a 
‘%1’ this means the key will pass one parameter to the program when invoked. The code 
does no seem to do any modification over him so possibly the original sample with a 
proper argument may show some clues. For it the program runs with a basic html file as 
argument,  due to the fact  that  the program is  in the  htmlfile  key registry.  The process 
internet  explorer  spawned  containing  the  html  file  passed  and  the  Process  explorer 
recorded the activity on the system. This is the functionality of a trojan.
The  most  interesting  thing  is  that  now  the  program  loaded  the  ws_32.dll,  used  for 
operations with sockets and network connection to other machines. 
Figure 54: Malware sample activity with one argument
Apart  from  that,  the  sample  performed  it  normal  activity  of  copying  himself  and 
modifying the registry. For going into a deeper detail for understanding the whole image, 
we will reverse engineer it trough IDA Pro. When the main function of the malware is 
executed it checks the number of arguments provided. Depending on that he goes on with 
the function or if not, jump a little bit more down going on with the normal flow of the 
program.  
Figure 55: Disassembly of the argument flow change
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The  names  of  the  variables  in  the  screenshots  are  the  ones  after  completing  all  the 
analysis. At the beginning they were random variable names. 
So this picture is after all the complete analysis by now we have the normal execution or a 
random function upper in the code. As the first debugging time I introduced no argument 
we will go on with the execution as I discovered it. The next was finding how character 
after character  a string was pushed into the stack.
Figure 56: Disassembly of the string hardcoded to the stack
The string contained in this pointer is “C:\\Windows\\System32\\tabcal.exe”. After it uses 
the function getModuleFileName for taking its own location and copies into the previous 
hardcoded path. For the next execution part, the malware push another string to the stack, 
this time containing the key value we are looking for, opens the registry, writes the new 
value  and  closes.  Just  as  seen  with  the  previous  dynamic  analysis.  The  value  of  the 
command ‘html\shell\open\command’ is pushed into the stack in runtime.
So the next part is analyzing the non-executed function. For this the IP (Instruction Pointer) 
is set directly  to the address were the jump to the function is. In there the first thing it 
does is calling a function situated just up of it, returning the value of the kernel32.dll.
Figure 57: FindKernel32.dll function on the sample
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With  this  address  the  malware  loads  the  address  of  several  functions  including  the 
LoadLibrary function to load dynamically other libraries and have more access to other 
system functions. 
Figure 58: Routine importing functions 
It charges the functions: LoadLibrary, CreateProcess and CloseHandle. After that it introduces 
the string “ws2_32.dll” and call the function LoadLibrary. With this the malware now has 
all the socket management. It is important which connection is trying to do for evaluating 
the thread of the sample. Moreover the function CreateProcess  is used to spawn a new 
process so we will need to trace that process also. The getProcAdress is  used to locate by 
name functions inside a library. Using that method it loads the functions: 
1.- WSASturtup.
2.- WSASocketA.
3.- connect. 
After that it creates a socket and tries a connection  When performing the functions to 
connect to socket the address and port need to be in somewhere that we can possibly find. 
In the end one of  the variables  pushed for  one of  the functions contained previously 
declared variables references and following the address of them we could reach the values 
of these variables.
Figure 59: Address and port where malware is trying to connect.
The two numbers correspond to endianness versions of “8008” as port and “192.168.1.43” 
as host. So the malware is probably trying to handle a connection with this address. Just 
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after attempting a connection the malware has a flow change point depending on the 
success of the previous attempt.  If the connection fails, it goes out of the function and 
return to main. If connection is successful it tries to create a “cmd.exe” process is launched. 
After  that,  the  main  process  goes  back  and  run  the  function  ShellExecute  to  execute 
Internet  Explorer  passing the  previously received argument.   Finally  it  goes  on with 
normal execution found out on the previous analysis.
When the connection is redirected it opens a shell on the remote waiting server. So this 
malware performs several functionalities over the system including some infection at first 
stage, with the aim to install a backdoor on the system. It infects the victim and changes 
the registry in order to be sure it will be executed. When that happens it opens a backdoor 
and execute the process the user expects when triggering the corresponding key in the 
registry.
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6.3 Ransomware
This section develops the evaluation criteria for the ransomware. Also explains an analysis 
the sample with network traces. It concludes with a possible research that can be done on 
the sample.
6.3.2 Ransomware evaluation system 
The ransomware is evaluated according to the following challenges that the student needs 
to fulfill in their document.
1.- Hash malware sample (0.25 pnts)
2.- Find strings (0.25 pnts)
3.- NT Header info (0.5 pnts)
3.1.- Timestamp for compilation date (0.25/0.5 pnts)
3.2.- Subsystem of the sample (console or gui) (0.25/0.5 pnts)
4.- Section headers SizeOfRawData vs VirtualSize (0.5 pnts)
5.- Imported and Exported Functions (1 pnts)
6.- Protecting environment(0.5 pnts).
7.- Identify the following behaviors: (2 pnts)
7.1.- Files accessed. (0.5/2 pnts)
7.2.- Processes called (taskill) (0.5/2 pnts)
7.3.- Accesses to the registry. (0.5/2 pnts)
7.3.4.- Wallpaper registry access (0.25/0.5 pnts)
7.4.- Network communication. (0.5/2 pnts)
8.- Detect encryption algorithm. (1,5 pnt)
8.1.- In the system DES encoded with base 64. (0,75 pnts) 
8.2.- With the server RSA-512 bits. (0,75 pnts)
9.- Capture network traffic. (2.5 pnts)
9.1.- Identify the packets containing the mac address. (1 pnt)
9.2.- Identify the reception of the public key for RSA. (1 pnt)
9.3.- Decode the encoded base64 communications. (0.5 pnts)
10.- Possible solutions to infected systems. As breaking encryption or sending the 
correct message to the server. (1 pnt)
The system is evaluated over a maximum of 10 points. In this solution is not 
considered the reverse engineering of the sample. There are several valid solutions for this 
exercise.
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6.3.1 Ransomware solution
The first thing we should do  with the malware sample is create a record of it. For that i 
take  the  hash  of  the  sample  and  its  exact  size.  The  malware  piece  given  is  a  PE32 
executable for MS Windows (console) Intel 80386 32-bit architecture.
TABLE 16: FINGERPRINT AND DATA OF THE SAMPLE
The first approach to the sample is done by examining the strings that it contains. For this 
we use the command strings from the terminal. This can tell us about the strings used by 
the code in order to identify possible behaviors. In the case of the sample they are meany 
of them. There is a set of strings that corresponds to python libraries for cryptography, 
socket  communication,  http,  pdf  management,  and threading.  Also there  are  string to 
kernel  functionalities  and kernel  libraries.  By  now is  early  for  saying  those  are  exact 
functions or just strings. It will be clear on the imported and exported function analysis. 
From the NT header  we can conclude two things. First one, the subsystem is Windows 
character-mode user interface (CUI). This indicates an interface will be displayed. Second, 
from the timestamp we can see when it  was compiled. The date corresponding to the 
timestamp 00000000 is January of 1970 at 00:00:00 CEST. This possibly corresponds to a 
manipulated timestamp. So we can not know when it was compiled.
Due to the size and some of the strings found by now, it is sensible to think that the 
sample obfuscate itself or at list a part of it. For proving this concept, it is compared the 
size of each section in disk and what they occupy in memory. All this data is stored in the 
PE header. If the difference from the size of disk to memory is remarkable, it is an 
indicator of packed or obfuscated.
Trojan.exe
Hash (sha-1) 4562443fba627bfbd6a7a623e680533aa1dd971d
Hash (md5) f9e084d3e4c8b1baf77e2d898ba1cc9a
Size (bytes) 6.264.266
Section Virtual size Size of raw data
.text 9A30 9C00
.data 34 200
.rdata 4F08 5000
.bss C698 0
.idata BF0 C00
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TABLE 17: VIRTUALSIZE AND SIZEOFRAWDATA OF WINDOWTIMER.EXE
As showed in Table XX there are no signs of packed or obfuscated malware. The numbers 
of the .bss section are completely normal. This section is used to carry all the uninitialized 
variables and is fulfilled with zeroes.
As there is no obfuscation it is easier to observe malware functionality by reattach the 
imported and exported functions and which Windows libraries is using by dynamic 
linking. Using the Dependency Walker tool it is possible to see this information. All this 
information is included on the PE headers. 
The executable loads three DLLs: 
1.- Kernel32.dll: Used nearly by all executables. It contains core 
windows functionalities.
2.- MSVCRT.dll: This library imports functions from other key core 
libraries of the system. 
3.- ws2_32.dll: This library is used for socket communication.
Figure 60: Imported functions kernel32.dll windowTimer.exe
.CRT 34 200
.tls 20 200
.rsrc EA34 EC00
Virtual size Size of raw dataSection
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As show in Figure 60, the list of functions imported by kernel32.dll is long. the most 
commonly used functions by malware are:
1.- CreateProcess: Creates and launches a new process. If any new process is 
created it will need to be analyzed.
2.- GetProcAddress: Retrieves the address of a function in a DLL loaded into 
memory.
3.- GetModuleFilename: Returns the filename of a function that is loaded in the 
current process. It can be used  to modify or copy files in the currently running process.
4.- GetModuleHandle: Used to obtain a handle to an already loaded module. It can 
be used too locate and modify code
5.- GetStartupInfo: Retrieves a structure containing details about how the current 
process was configured to run, such as where the standard handles are directed.
6.- LoadLibrary: Loads a dynamic library into a process that may not have been 
loaded when the program started.
7.- VirtualProtectEx: Changes the protection on a region of memory.
The imported functions from the MSVCRT.dll are not giving any trace of the malware 
functionality. The functions used form this library are really common in many programs. 
The ws2_32.dll library imported just one function.
The basic static analysis is covered without any evidence of what this sample is doing. In 
the next step the main functionality of the program will be captured by the program 
Process Monitor. This tool allows to monitories every process in the computer and also 
includes a filter for following just the traces of the program that you want. In this case the 
sample has as process name the same as the executable.  
When running the malware a fullscreen window is displayed. This reveal that apparently 
this sample is a ransomware.After following the instructions it was possible to close it and 
see the output of Process Monitor.
The output of the tool covers a lot of processes with a variety of functions. One of the first 
things it does, is to create in a temporal folder a considerable number of python libraries 
as displayed in Figure 61. Among them libraries for encodings in different languages. Then 
the program handles a connection to the internet. It continues by accessing all files in the 
“user” directory. I changes the registry for modifying the wallpaper. After that there is a 
long internet communication and after it launches the process taskill a considerable 
amount of times. 
After the button is pressed, the taskill process is not called and  the computer tries to 
communicate with the network. And goes trough al the files inside the mentioned 
directory. Where it reads and writes. At the end the program closes all the handles to the 
libraries it creates at the beginning.
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Figure 61: Process monitor python libraries creation
The confirmation of the internet communication gives place to the traffic analysis. With all 
this information we can ensure that the sample exchanges the key used for encryption 
with an external server for storage as indicated in the banner. 
When analyzing traffic Wireshark tool is used. This program runs in a Kali VM, acting as a 
MITM (man in the middle).It is used the command version “tshark” for doing the network 
sniffing. For that first the interface of the network card must enable the “monitor mode”. All 
the traffic is dumped into a file and this file ins analyzed after with Wireshark that provides 
a GUI for displaying the packets.
The communication done by the ransomware is composed by 5 different messages in 
which the infected computer indicates the mac address with a letter to handle the needed 
communications with the server
The first communication is done with a message including the string “K:MAC 
ADDRESS”, showed in Figure 62.
Figure 62: First message of windowTimer.exe
With this the client is providing an identifier (mac address), to the server. The first letter K 
indicates that the victims computer has been infected. Instead of sending the key. The 
client now waits for a communication of the server. The server sends the communication 
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seen on Figure 63. This data corresponds to a public key of an encryption algorithm. The 
key is just 512 bits long. So the encryption is weak.
Figure 63: Public key sent by server
After this, the ransomware encrypts the key used for encryption. And send it encoded in 
base 64. The string sent from the infected computer to the server is: 
“HV99kSLKh1SeSrEVgoK9Ojbfl8dAalWaAxGLQcfnexucfj8K7WVjEPEelGplIK437BKE67vErlR
Hpgt9WmUlQ==“ After decoding the sent packet the final ASCII value of the encrypted 
key is:  _}”TJ:6@jUA{~?CzQJQ-i
After clicking the button restore files, the infected computer sent the message: 
“D:MAC_ADDRESS”. With this the victim identifies itself to the server. The packet sent 
can be seen on Figure 64.
Figure 64: Message sent before decryption
In the end, the server sends the decrypted password encoded in base64. This corresponds 
to the symmetric key used for encrypting the files. Packet in Figure 65.
Figure 65: Deciphered password
A possible solution to this ransomware can be craft packet with the mac address of the 
victim computers and recover the password and deciphering the files after. Another 
possible solution is to try to break the algorithm or capture the key in runtime by reverse 
engineering the sample. This is not done in the solution of the practice but in section  7.3.4 
it is be covered how it can be performed.
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6.3.4 Further ransomware research
A depth study is needed for the ransomware to be completely studied. It would be 
recommended to do an entropy analysis in the encrypted files and try to guess the 
cryptography that is being used. Moreover reversing engineering the sample, although 
tedious would be needed for capturing the key in run time or trying to see what 
algorithms is using for encryption. This gives the possibility of a full malware 
understanding and direct problem solving. 
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7. Project planning budget and socioeconomic context
This section covers how the project was planned and the economic and financial 
expenses that it involves.This project was planned between the tutor and the student. This 
project can be used for online tutorial if it is decided to do so.The main criteria of the 
project planning was settled for accomplishing as much as malware samples as possible. 
By how time and productivity developed in the end the followed scheme represented as 
Gantt char can be seen on Figure 66.
Figure 66: Gantt chart of the project
Constant corrections and several meetings not reflected on diagram where needed for the 
correct development of each section. There was a total of 14 meetings between tutor and 
student.
The  initial  study  corresponds  the  online  course  “The  life  of  binaries” .  This  course 6
explains the background of the PE  knowledge and gives an example of virus that was 
used as model.  It  also includes the reference to “Understanding windows Shellcode"[4] 
paper. The engineers of the three samples correspond to what is documented in the thesis 
memory  written  on  the  antepenultimate  section.  The  revision  time  was  used  for 
improvements and troubleshooting. 
This project was made without the investment of any money on it. However it is detailed 
the expenses of the material used and professional involvement. The student analyst work 
day corresponds to 5 hours. Meetings are 2 hours durations
TABLE 18: PERSONAL EXPENSES
Total Hours Cost per hour (€/h) Total (€)
Junior Malware Analyst 649 22,25 14.450
Senior Malware Analyst 28 46,36 1.298,08
- 15.748,08
 Link: http://www.opensecuritytraining.info6
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 The  computer  used  are  the  computers  used  by  student  and  tutor.  Thanks  to  the 
agreement that the university has with Microsoft it was possible to take important and 
expensive software free. 
TABLE 18: EXPENSES EQUIPMENT TABLE
The formula used for the calculation on Table 18 is:
(Nº months equipment used/Deptrcation period) x Cost
Finally it can be concluded that the total budget of the project corresponds to SIXTEEN 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TIRTY SEVEN EUROS WITH FIFTEEN CENTS 
(16.437,159 €), VAT not added.
Concept Cost Dedication Depecration 
period (Month)
Applicable cost
Mac book pro 1.649,00 € 6,5 Months 36 392,095 €
Mac book air 1.249,00 € 6.5 Months 36 296,984 €
Windows 10 OS 0 € - - 0 €
Total 689,079 €
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8. Regulatory framework 
This project is done under legal terms. The malware was done with and for 
academical purposes. It was developed for an isolated system under special conditions. It 
fulfills any regulation framework specially  “Ley Orgánica 15/1999 de 13 de diciembre de 
Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal, (LOPD)” under spanish legal terms.
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9. Conclusions and improvements
In order to conclude the document a further conclusion of the work done is offered 
along with all the possible improvements of it. 
9.1 Conclusions
The continuous growing of the cyberthreat in our society lead to the need of better 
trained experts to help to prevent the damage. However to do this we need to train our 
future security professionals in a way so they are able to face real threats, in order to 
accomplish that is needed a knowledge on a variety of fields including malware analysis.
Developing this practice has been really challenging due to all the new specific  
knowledge needed for the task. In order to provide a good material for the students to 
take profit of their studies, it was selected common techniques and known attacks that old 
and modern malware perform. Doing the effort for the malware to work on Windows 10 
is valuable for the students to get in touch with analyzing using modern software. 
The solutions given are accurate and can be used as reference as learning example and 
improving knowledge. Also it can be used as reference for the teacher to estimate how a 
solution to the given samples should be. However if the student provides a different 
solution it needs to be considered by the teacher on how to evaluate it.
9.2 Improvements
There are three main areas for the global project improvement are listed and 
explained as follows:
1.- Include more malware. Adding different malware samples as a Rootkit, 
developing malware for other OS. It extends the background knowledge for providing 
more exercises for the students. 
2.- Improve actual malware. Each of the samples can be improved. This can 
be done by giving the trojan and the virus the capacity of bypassing ASLR and DEP. To 
the ransomware provide multithreading in the encryption and decryption done by the 
client.
3.- Improve system. Creating a script for handling the student emails 
request of the practice. Send a given malware with the instructions to follow and write it 
in a database that the teacher can see. Also managing the timing for and of the exercise 
handle.
This are the best improvements from a technical perspective of the developed project. This 
project can be continued for anyone that desires it, with the goal of proving a better 
education.
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